https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-897896
Fmr. IDF chief Herzi Halevi
No one on any end of the political spectrum will agree with this, but Herzi Halevi is a tragic unsung hero.
Tragic because he was the IDF chief of staff when the October 7 massacre took place in 2023. It happened on his watch, leading to the worst Israeli defeat since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He resigned in March 2025, about a year earlier than the standard three-year term.
A hero because he was a senior special forces commando for years, then a commander of the special forces, then a frontline commander during the 2008-09 invasion who was prevented from dealing Hamas a larger blow in Rafah by political-diplomatic considerations, then head of the Military Intelligence Directorate and Southern Command, then deputy chief of staff, and then the IDF chief of staff who beat Hamas in northern Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah in three successive invasions from October 2023 until the summer of 2024.
During those periods, he played key roles when the IDF killed Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, bludgeoned Hezbollah from September-November 2024, killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, destroyed Iran’s most advanced Russian S-300 antiaircraft missile systems in October 2024, and planned the Rising Lion operation from October 2024-March 2025, including rebuilding much of the IAF’s strike capabilities prior to October 2023.
Unsung because that long list of accomplishments will forever – or at least for the coming years – be overshadowed by the horrible stain of the October 7 massacre.
All of this has been true for more than a year, but it is time to write about it now for a few reasons.
First, Halevi has now gone more than a year since resigning without making his own case publicly. This was probably an error on his part, but he has always been a better general than a public-relations manager.
Ronen Bar and Halevi'In The War Room' on shelves this September
Second, I have a new book coming out in September called In The War Room, with The Wall Street Journal’s Elliot Kaufman, in which a complex, detailed, and nuanced portrayal of Halevi and other top Israeli and US decision-makers is given.
But it has already become clear to me that various people and media outlets may cherry-pick portions of the book that are critical, while ignoring the larger portions that are positive, to present him in a selective negative light.
Some of those who will do this will do so because they will fail to read the whole book or understand all of the nuances that the book unpacks.
Others, and this is the third point, will do so because of the upcoming Israeli election.
Once election season starts, everything becomes black and white. A leader was a success or a failure. And anyone else who was around who shares in your success takes away from your credit, so better to label them a complete, unmitigated failure.
Many participants in the upcoming election have been blaming Halevi for the October 7 massacre for years in no small part to avoid their own contributory responsibility.
Let there be no doubt: Halevi shares responsible for October 7 – along with all of the other senior defense chiefs, and all of the political chiefs, over a period of many years – some say going back a decade and some say two decades – in which there was a “conceptica” (conceptual framework) that incorrectly assumed Hamas as it was constituted could easily be contained and deterred and did not need to be treated as an invasion threat.
This conceptual framework also avoided even limited diplomatic initiatives for an extended period, hoping Hamas, and the Palestinians more broadly, could just be ignored.
And since I have gotten to know Halevi – military reporters get periodic group access to most of the IDF’s senior officers at one point or another – I know that he truly takes responsibility for his role regarding October 7. He does not just say he has contributory responsibility generically; he makes sure to add: “I personally am among those responsible” – which was why he resigned early.
But it is profoundly simplistic to think that one man, even the IDF chief of staff at the time, was solely or primarily responsible.
When Halevi assumed his role in January 2023, he did not just adopt everything that his predecessors had done; he certainly had new initiatives and ideas. But there were certain built-in limits and rules of the game.
Definitely during the terms of Gabi Ashkenazi (2007-2011), Benny Gantz (2011-2015), Gadi Eisenkot (2015-2019), and Aviv Kohavi (2019-2023), the determination by both the Israeli political – Ehud Olmert (2006-2009), Benjamin Netanyahu (for most of 2009-2021), Naftali Bennett (2021-2022), and Netanyahu again (since 2022) – and defense senior echelons, including the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency and the Mossad, was that larger conflict with Hamas was to be avoided in an effort to “manage” the conflict.
This misplaced thinking was so deep that mid-level Israeli intelligence officers never even passed on to Halevi and other IDF senior staff the Walls of Jericho plan that the IDF Intelligence Corps intercepted more than a year before the October 7 massacre.
It was so deep that in a moment of impressive and haunted honesty, Halevi has admitted that if he had been shown the plan, it might have made him a bit more concerned when he was warned about Hamas making trouble around 3-5 a.m. hours before the invasion.
But he probably would have made the same basic decisions. He has explained that this was because it was ingrained among all of Israel that Hamas simply would not dare to be crazy enough to invade. Any contrary information then was reflexively explained away.
Halevi was among the first to take public responsibility for October 7, when many Israeli officials delayed doing so, or did so with so many qualifications that it is hard to say whether they ever took responsibility.
Taking responsibility and resigning was a contribution in an age when public officials worldwide, not just in Israel, have started to treat taking responsibility as a disease and prefer to redirect, change the subject, or “double down” on blaming someone else.
And with all we know today, maybe he could have been more aggressive in calling up much larger reinforcements – a small number of reinforcements were called up – just in case there was some horror scenario that no one expected, instead of worrying so much about exposing the identity of Israeli intelligence assets to Hamas. That was one reason – it turned out to be grossly mistaken – why he wanted to avoid too many large Israeli moves.
And that is only part of Halevi’s legacy.
Those who criticize him personally the harshest for October 7 also seem to create a bizarre dichotomy in which he is only responsible for any IDF failures but not its successes.
This is not how responsibility works. He is responsible for the successes as well as the failures.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-897896













