Revoking Citizenship of Terrorists

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-903296

https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/430568

Israel seeks to revoke citizenship of two men convicted in Hamas Cellcom cyber plot

The request is against Rani Awf and Shadi Aidi, two Israeli prisoners convicted of providing security information to an enemy during wartime by shutting down Cellcom's computer systems for Hamas.

     Jerusalem District Court

The prosecution filed a precedent-setting request to revoke the Israeli citizenship of two security prisoners convicted of plotting to help Hamas disable Cellcom’s communications network during a future war or military operation.

The request against Rani Awf and Shadi Aidi was submitted to the Central District Court in Lod at the request of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who holds the relevant powers of the interior minister, and with the approval of the attorney-general.

According to the prosecution, this is the first time Israel has used this procedure, known as the “criminal route” for revoking citizenship.

Added to the Citizenship Law in 2011, the route allows a court that convicted a person of terrorism or certain serious security offenses to revoke their citizenship, in addition to the sentence already imposed, if the interior minister requests it and the attorney-general approves.

A qualifying conviction does not automatically lead to revocation. The state must still persuade the court that the case is among the “extreme and exceptional” cases serious enough to justify the step.

    Cellcom Logo

Israeli courts can revoke citizenship upon terrorism conviction

The Citizenship Law expressly allows revocation after a conviction for assisting an enemy during wartime. Awf and Aidi, however, were convicted of conspiring to assist an enemy during wartime because their plan was stopped before Cellcom’s systems were disabled.

The prosecution argues that this distinction does not exclude them. Legally, conspiring or attempting to commit an offense in its state-security chapter is treated in the same way as committing it.

This conspiracy conviction therefore gives the court the power to consider revoking the men’s citizenship, the state argued.

The prosecution is relying on a 2022 Supreme Court ruling that upheld Israel’s power to revoke citizenship for a grave breach of allegiance, while stressing that citizenship is a fundamental right tied to a person’s identity.

The justices said the power must be used sparingly.

They explained that its main purpose is not to add another punishment but to express the state’s conclusion that a citizen’s actions severed the most basic bond between the individual and the country.

The Supreme Court overturned the individual revocation decisions in the case because of defects in how the requests were filed. Several justices said the criminal route should generally be preferred because it gives defendants stronger procedural protections and allows the court to rely on facts already established in the criminal case.

The prosecution said it followed those safeguards here. Awf and Aidi were notified that revocation was being considered, submitted written arguments, and received oral hearings.

The men are Israeli citizens by birth and have no other citizenship or legal status abroad, according to the request.

Revoking their citizenship would therefore not automatically deport them or leave them without legal status. The state said they would instead receive permanent residency in Israel or another permanent status established by law.

The request stems from a plot that the two admitted to carrying out while working at Cellcom.

Awf worked as a geographic information systems developer, while Aidi was an outside consultant specializing in communications and computer networks. Both had extensive access to the company’s systems.

Plans to disable communications systems years in the works

According to the amended indictment, the two began planning in 2015 to develop the capability to disable central Cellcom computers and information systems during a war or military operation.

Aidi provided tools and computer code designed to bypass security systems, conceal unauthorized activity, overload servers, and preserve access to sensitive parts of the network.

Awf maintained contact with senior Hamas officials in Turkey and transferred sensitive information about Israeli communications infrastructure, Cellcom’s cybersecurity systems, and ways to bypass them.

Cellcom provides services to civilian customers as well as the IDF and Israel Police.

The two were convicted under a plea agreement of conspiring to assist an enemy during wartime and providing information to an enemy with the intention of harming state security.

Awf was also convicted of disclosing an intention to commit treason and contact with a foreign agent.

In October 2024, Awf was sentenced to 11 years in prison and fined NIS 30,000. Aidi was sentenced to five-and-a-half years and fined NIS 15,000. Both also received suspended sentences.

The filing acknowledges that the plot was stopped before Cellcom’s systems were disrupted and that no concrete damage was proven.

The prosecution nevertheless argued that the court should focus on the years of preparation, the abuse of workplace access, the planned timing during a war, and the potential damage to a communications network used by civilians and security forces.

The sentencing court described that potential danger as “high, very high” and said an attack in the cyber world could be as serious as, or even more serious than, a violent attack in the physical world.

“The actions taken by the two, which were intended to damage a central Israeli communications infrastructure during a military operation in order to assist the enemy in its war against the state, constitute a clear and extreme breach of allegiance,” the prosecution wrote.

Their conduct, the state argued, is precisely the kind of exceptional case for which the citizenship-revocation law was created.

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-903296 (above)

https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/430568 (below)

Unprecedented: State seeks to strip citizenship from terrorists

In first-of-its-kind move, State Attorney's Office seeks to revoke citizenship of terrorists convicted of plotting to help Hamas during wartime.

The State Attorney's Office has filed an unprecedented request with the Central District Court to revoke the Israeli citizenship of two security prisoners, Rani Ouf and Shadi Aidi.

The request was submitted at the direction of the Prime Minister, who holds the Interior Minister's authority for such matters, and with the approval of the Attorney General, after the two were convicted of, among other offenses, conspiring to assist the enemy during wartime and passing information to the enemy with the intent of harming State security.

According to the State Attorney's Office, this is the first request filed under the criminal track of the Citizenship Law to revoke citizenship on the grounds of breach of allegiance. The State argued that "the offenses for which the defendants were convicted justify the step of revoking citizenship, as they constitute an extreme and extraordinary breach of the duty of loyalty that citizens owe the State."

According to the request, the two men worked for Cellcom and held extensive access privileges to the company's computer systems and communications infrastructure; they spent years advancing a plan to disable the company's computer and information systems during a war or military operation in order to assist the Hamas terrorist organization. The request also noted that the plan included the transfer of sensitive information about the company's communications infrastructure and cybersecurity systems, as well as the introduction of tools that would allow the disruption of the communications network.

Both terrorists were convicted after pleading guilty to conspiring to assist the enemy during wartime and passing information to the enemy with the intent of harming the country's security.

Rani Ouf was also convicted of expressing intent to commit treason and maintaining contact with a foreign agent. In 2024, he was sentenced to 11 years in prison, a suspended sentence, and a fine. Shadi Aidi was sentenced to five-and-a-half years in prison, a suspended sentence, and a fine.

The State argued that the pair's actions amounted to "acts of outright treason and a blatant violation of the fundamental duty of loyalty to the State," stressing that the plot was intended to be carried out during wartime, was motivated by nationalist and ideological considerations, for the purpose of assisting Palestinian Arab terror organizations.

The request also notes that the Citizenship Law's provision allowing revocation of citizenship for breach of allegiance was created precisely for cases such as these, in which the fundamental bond between a citizen and the State has been severed.

https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/430568

Massive Sand Barrier Dividing Gaza

https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-903208

IDF confirms building massive sand barrier dividing Gaza after satellite imagery emerges

According to the satellite imagery, more than 23 kilometers were built in recent months through areas where Palestinian communities once stood.

Without any public announcement, the IDF has been building a large sand-wall barrier separating the 50-70% of the Gaza Strip it controls from the areas controlled by Hamas, the military confirmed on Tuesday.

Earth imaging company Planet Labs PBC observed the topographical changes using satellite imagery and provided them to the Associated Press, which was the first outlet to break the news.

According to the satellite imagery, more than 23 kilometers were built in recent months, running throughout the Strip, often through areas where Palestinian communities once stood but have long since been demolished by the IDF.

Such an extensive sand wall would be equal to over half the length of Gaza, which is around 40 km. long and 11 km. wide (at its widest point).

It was unclear whether the IDF’s goal was to finish the wall across the entire Strip and whether it seeks to hem Hamas and over two million Palestinians to around 30% of the territory where they currently reside, or closer to the 47% Hamas retained from the October 2025 ceasefire.

Israeli soldiers enter Gaza at the border as seen from Israel, October 3, 2025 (credit: REUTERS/AMIR COHEN)

The IDF specifically declined to elaborate to The Jerusalem Post on the size, details, or more specific goals of the new construction.

In recent months, the IDF has, gradually and without any real battles, pushed Hamas back from the 47% line closer to a 30% line in retaliation for the Gaza terror group failing to start the disarmament process which it was due to begin in early 2026.

In contrast, Hamas has said it is only obligated to begin a partial disarmament process once Israel allows at least partial rebuilding of Gaza.

To date, the Board of Peace, which is supposed to manage the negotiations under the October 2025 ceasefire, has mostly taken Israel’s side regarding the dispute, but has also loudly opposed, along with US President Donald Trump, who towers above the board, any Israeli desire to launch a new major invasion of the Hamas-controlled areas of the Strip.

Neither CENTCOM, which is tasked with monitoring the ceasefire, nor the Board of Peace responded to AP inquiries about the barrier.

IDF: New Gaza boundary a 'no-go point'

The IDF told the Post that the new boundary was designed to make the no-go point for Palestinians clear to those residing in Hamas-controlled areas as well as to prevent any attempt by the terror group to infiltrate Israeli border towns, which still remain only a few kilometers away at points.

One of the features of Hamas’s successful October 7, 2023 invasion of southern Israel was an ability to infiltrate Israeli border villages in a period of minutes due to their proximity to Gazan territory.

According to Planet Labs PBC, a portion of the sand-wall network in southern Gaza was extended by more than 2 km. between July 1 and July 15.

Previously, the southern Gaza network had extended around 500 meters long, but it then increased to about 2.4 km., cutting through the ruins of the deep southern Gaza city of Rafah, from the al-Mawasi coastal refugee camps.

The AP report said that if construction continued in its current direction, it would join up with the longest stretch of the barrier, which runs nearly unbroken for around 17 km. from the mid-southern city of Khan Yunis to near Gaza City, in the north

Despite Palestinian and international concerns about Israel potentially moving for a longer-term land grab, the IDF has been compelled to withdraw multiple times from large portions of Gaza during the war, even after building large new bases, such as withdrawing from the Morag Corridor in early 2025.

https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-903208

Earthen berms and ramparts are among the oldest architectural defensive structures in human history, dating back to ancient siege warfare and Roman circumvallation lines. Historically, field armies threw up massive earthworks to enclose besieged cities or protect garrison boundaries at low engineering costs.

Modern warfare experts and military engineers see earth berms as structures that offer distinct advantages: They are easy and quick to be built; they provide better defence against heavy artillery and rocket fire and provide height to the defensive posts and surveillance sensors.

Covert Naval Operations

https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-903217

Inside IDF's naval operations: Israel, US repeatedly hunted Iran's navy chief before succeeding

Israel, US repeatedly failed to kill Iran's Alireza Tangsiri before successful strike • New details reveal Israeli naval attacks on Hezbollah commanders at Beirut's Ramada Hotel and a mobile HQ

On March 26, the IDF said that naval intelligence had assisted with assassinating Iranian Naval Chief Alireza Tangsiri in the port city of Bandar Abbas, with eliminating key Iranian naval cruise missile production sites, and Iranian sites related to submarines and other underwater threats.

At the time, some had deemed Tangsiri’s assassination – and the navy’s role in it – a crucial moment that led the Islamic Republic to agree to the terms of the ceasefire in early April.

Until now, the details pertaining to how Tangsiri was killed have been shrouded in mystery.

Many of the details are still classified. For the first time, however, The Jerusalem Post can disclose that, prior to March 26, the US and Israel had already tried to assassinate Tangsiri several times.

The process started with the Israeli naval intelligence and operations directorates carrying out specialized research to understand who Iran's naval officials were as well as when and how they generally operated.

IRGC Navy chief Alireza Tangsiri stands in front of a map depicting the Strait of Hormuz, pictured in 2020; illustrative. (credit: TASNIM NEWS AGENCY/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS)

Next, the navy’s operations directorate placed specific individuals, including Tangsiri, in the target bank for the IDF’s intelligence and air force units.

After that, IDF intelligence used the initial leads that it received from the navy to acquire the real-time intelligence needed for the assassination, which it eventually passed on to the air force

The navy’s operations directorate maintained an officer with the air force targeting staff to perform final checks on the intelligence before the various strikes went forward against Tangsiri and other Iranian naval targets.

The IDF struck Iranian long-range naval cruise missile sites

Around the same time that Tangsiri was killed, the air force, acting on information from IDF naval intelligence and the broader IDF intelligence directorate, also struck two key naval cruise missile production sites in Tehran.

The targeted sites operated under the command of the Iranian Defense Ministry and were used by the Iranian regime to develop and manufacture long-range naval cruise missiles, which are capable of rapidly destroying targets at sea and on land.

These weapons could be used against the US and other allies seeking to open the Strait of Hormuz.

At the time, defense sources said that Israel also continued to provide intelligence assistance to the US regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

On April 16, the navy said that it had already undertaken or provided critical intelligence for 154 attacks during the early 2026 war with Iran and Hezbollah.

Ninety-five of these attacks were against Iran. Of those 95 attacks, 68 of them were undertaken by US forces, but were entirely based on Israeli naval intelligence, with cooperation from the naval operations directorate.

At the time, all of the IDF’s actions either directly or indirectly reduced Iran’s capability to threaten the Straits of Hormuz, which is the Islamic regime’s most powerful pressure point on the US, the West, Arab countries, and others.

Regarding the navy and Iran, IDF navy Lt. “G” previously told the Post that, during Operation Rising Lion against Iran, “I was in a bunch of operations. To be part of these operations felt like a substantial contribution.”

G added, “For two-and-a-half years, sometimes, it was hard to see why the training mattered. But when you are on the front lines at sea, it helps you connect everything you studied to something real and practical. The climax was against Iran – we had the chance to perform all of the skills which we learned during the course.”

IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir seen aboard an Israeli Navy warship, March 26, 2025 (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

Israeli navy was involved in assassinating of five senior IRGC officials in Beirut

On April 16, the navy revealed for the first time that it had been involved in both intelligence and operations in eliminating five senior IRGC Quds Force liaison officials (who were working with Hezbollah) in an attack on the Ramada Hotel in Beirut on March 8.

Until then, even the basic fact of the navy’s involvement had been kept classified.

In the same navy briefing, it was revealed that, during that attack, the navy fired 14 missiles to kill the five officials, who were top commanders in Quds Force-Hezbollah intelligence and terrorist financing, and had links to Palestinian terrorist groups in Lebanon.

The terrorist-financing official was the key actor in transferring $770 million from Iran to Hezbollah over the past year, the IDF reported.

The Post can now reveal new details from the assassination, including that two different Israeli naval ships were involved.

Unlike the Iran case where the navy started the process, the Post can reveal that in this case IDF intelligence started the process of researching and locating the targets, but then turned to the navy to carry out the strike.

Specifically, the Post understands that IDF intelligence wanted to utilize the navy’s precision capacities to avoid any collateral harm to the large number of diplomats, media, and civilians in the hotel.

For purposes of this operation and others, the navy is unique for its ability to operate in or near hostile territory for longer periods than other arms of the military.

If the air force justifiably brags about moving from a “stand out” posture to a relative “stand in” posture, where its fighter jets or drones can spend time hovering over a target in Iranian or Lebanese territory, the navy can go even farther to a “standby” posture.

In this case, “standby” means staying in the area for an almost indefinite period, far longer than any drone or aircraft can.

Israel Navy soldiers salute as a German Navy vessel sails past during a visit to Haifa Naval Base, published June 25, 2026. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

Hezbollah commander assassinated by Israeli navy

In another incident, the Post can reveal that the navy assassinated the number two commander for Hezbollah’s northern command at his mobile headquarters. Because the headquarters was mobile, this meant that time was of the essence even more than in other cases.

The Post has learned that the naval operations directorate swiftly carried out the operation; there was only a short period of time between the naval operations directorate receiving the information needed to strike them and the strike being carried out.

Sources did not want to name which naval vessels undertook these attacks. However, on June 10, 2025, the Post and Hebrew media previously reported that two Israeli naval missile boats, one of which was a Saar 6 vessel, fired two long-range precision missiles from hundreds of kilometers away at the Houthi port of Hodeidah.

In addition, the Post has learned that models for rehearsing attacks can now be used in nearly every operation because the navy, using new technologies, can produce models of target areas in a matter of hours. In the past, producing those models could take days.

https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-903217

Ancient Humans Navigated Northern Israel With Remarkable Precision to get Tools

https://www.jpost.com/archaeology/article-902838

Ancient humans precisely navigated northern Israel to find right stones for tools

Basalt held special importance at GBY (Gesher Benot Ya’akov), particularly for producing large cutting tools like handaxes and cleavers

     Microscopic view of Basalt

Early hominins living in the ancient Galilee were able to navigate their landscape with remarkable precision to locate specific rock sources for their tools, according to a new study.

Gesher Benot Ya’akov (GBY), one of Israel’s most important prehistoric sites, dates back to about 780,000 years ago. It preserves multiple Acheulian hominin settlements along the shores of paleo-Lake Hula in northern Israel.

Excavations at the site, directed by study co-author Professor Naama Goren-Inbar from the Hebrew University, have previously unearthed stone tools made of flint, limestone, and basalt. Evidence of fire use, plant exploitation, animal processing, and fish consumption has also been discovered at the site.

Basalt seemingly held special importance at GBY, particularly for the production of large cutting tools such as hand axes and cleavers.

Earlier research has shown that making such tools was no simple task: hominins had to select large basalt slabs, work them down into massive cores, strike off large flakes, and then carefully shape those flakes into finished hand axes.

Such a process required planning, technical skill, and detailed knowledge of basalt’s properties.

Sampling basalt flows in the vicinity of Gesher Benot Ya‘akov, July 17, 2026. (credit: N. Goren-Inbar/Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Where did materials for their tools come from?

The new study set out to determine exactly where that basalt came from.

By comparing the chemical signatures of basalt tools with samples collected from nearby basalt flows, including material pulled from the Eshel Ya’akov borehole (a deep scientific drilling hole), which reaches basalt layers now buried underground, researchers were able to match many artifacts to sources within about a kilometer of the site.

Interestingly, some of the tools were chemically matched to basalt sources that no longer exist on the surface. These sources may have been buried over time or eroded away by millennia of tectonic activity, the study explained.

Different basalt used for different tools

Additionally, the chemical analysis revealed that the tools varied in type.

Some cleavers seem to have been made from basalt sources different from those used to produce most hand axes and giant cores.

According to the study, early hominins deliberately sought out basalt with specific qualities suited to particular tools.

Further, while the giant cores were consistently linked to basalt found close by or now hidden beneath the site, some of the cleavers discovered appear to have been made from basalt that doesn’t match any of the local, sampled sources.

Even more notable, the pattern of selective sourcing appears repeatedly across multiple archaeological layers at GBY, spanning tens of thousands of years, suggesting it wasn’t a one-off choice but a tradition passed down through generations.

Taken together, the findings paint a picture of early hominins as far more than opportunistic scavengers of whatever stone lay around.

Ancient hominins appear to have carried detailed mental maps of their surroundings, understood how the landscape around them was changing, and applied that knowledge purposefully, choosing “the right rock for the right tool at the right time.”

The complete findings were published in the journal Scientific Reports in early June, titled “Geochemical basalt investigation reveals procurement strategy at the Acheulian site of Gesher Benot Ya‘aqov, Dead Sea Transform, Israel.”

The research was led by Dr. Tzahi Golan and Dr. Yoav Ben Dor of the Geological Survey of Israel, together with Prof. Naama Goren-Inbar of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who has directed excavations at the site for decades.

https://www.jpost.com/archaeology/article-902838

On a Quest for Million-year-old Culture in Northern Israel

                 Prof. Gonen Sharon at the Gesher Benot Ya'akov dig in northern Israel

Newly unearthed stone tools come to light in the excavation of Gesher Benot Ya'akov

"This is holy ground – the most important [hominin] site in the world."

He immediately qualifies: "Among the most important [hominin] sites in the world."

He spent the last two years working a few hundred meters upriver on a site contemporary with Gesher Benot Ya'akov, alluringly named "NBA – North of Bridge Acheulian." It is associated with the same culture, he says – from almost a million years ago.

      Prof. Gonen Sharon and Sergey Alon in the trench at Gesher Benot Ya'akov, wet from groundwater

 

"We aspire to answer the questions from earlier excavations," he says: ground-breaking work that discovered things we never knew about ancient humans, and raised even more questions.

The stone tools the local hominins made were almost all made of the local volcanic basalt.

     Basalt hand-axe from 720,000 years ago, found at Gesher Benot Yaakov

This section of riverbed by the bridge called Gesher Benot Ya'akov was dug out by tractor to reroute the Jordan River and drain wetland (tractors were dredging the riverbed as late as 1999).

"They kept digging the riverbed and dumping the debris," Sharon mourns. "Disaster."

"I don't care much about human bones – bones get grants, but what can we learn from them? Almost nothing about the hominins' cognitive abilities," Sharon says.

"We can learn so much more from a stone they shaped, how they did it, why they did it, what led them to make it, why they chose that stone. What matters isn't who they were," he continues. "What matters is what the evidence of their activity can tell us about their culture, whoever they were, almost a million years ago."

The evidence of human activity is stone tools, mostly made of local basalt and some of flint of uncertain origin, and marks on animal bones.

And controlled fire. Nira Alperson-Afil and Goren-Inbar, the archaeologists from 30 years ago, and Sharon today argue the scene sports the earliest ever evidence outside Africa for controlled fire, from about 780,000 years ago.

At Gesher Benot Yaakov, the evidence of controlled fire is concentrations of burned flint (over a certain heat, the stone changes color). If the stones had been burned by random brushfire, discolored stones they'd be randomly scattered all over the place. But they're not.

It isn't that the hominins used the same hearth over the 100,000-year sequence under investigation. However, at different points in time over that sequence, they created and maintained hearths at specific spots on the site, Sharon explains. Not necessarily always the same spot over the eons.

"A concentration of burned flint is a fireplace," he sums up.

What about the argument that maybe they "harvested" fire from a wildfire, and maintained it? You can't keep a brushfire running for 50,000 years, he answers. "The fact that you find fire in these places means they controlled fire – they knew how to start, keep it, use it. This is the earliest evidence outside Africa."

In Africa the earliest claimed evidence for controlled fire is a million years ago at Wonderwerk Cave in today's South Africa; some argue the case of another Israeli cave which may have evidence of fire even earlier, also possibly a million years.

They also ate vegetable matter, and the preservation is so extraordinary that we may have a clue what it was. For example, we know figs and plums existed there while carobs didn't. There were also a lot of nuts, which the hominins would have eaten with the help of nutcrackers the archaeologists have identified at the site.

What is a million-year-old nutcracker? Basically, anvils. Stones with concavities: place the nut in the pit, bash it with another stone and you have a cracked nut. Monkeys use nutting stones, Sharon says; no reason to think the hominins couldn't.

"We are going back to the most important site on Earth to open up a large area, to use new technology, to try to answer the many questions that arose from the amazing excavations," he says, summing up their new quest in what had once been paradise.

https://www.haaretz.com/archaeology/2024-09-30/ty-article-magazine/on-a-quest-for-million-year-old-culture-in-northern-israel/00000192-4241-d07b-aff3-57e731d60000