After receiving a report of gunfire on a vehicle, police raid complex and find M-16 assault rifle hiding in preschool sandbox.
Police officers operating in the Bedouin city of Rahat in southern Israel found an M-16 assault rifle hidden in a sandbox in a preschool. During the operation, officers also seized dozens of bullets and a pistol clip and arrested a resident of the city in his 30s.
The activity was part of the police's Operation Iron Net, focusing on the gunfire phenomenon and the possession of illegal weapons in the city. Officers from the Rahat Police Station operated together with Border Police National Guard officers to locate weapons and suspects involved in shooting offenses.
The investigation began after a report was received on August 9th regarding gunfire directed at a vehicle in the city. After receiving the report, detectives and National Guard officers worked to locate the suspect.
During the operation, forces raided a residential compound that also contains a preschool in the area from which the report was received. A search of the site uncovered an M-16 rifle, dozens of 9 mm rounds, and a pistol magazine.
A resident of Rahat in his 30s was subsequently arrested. According to police, he is suspected of involvement in the shooting at the vehicle, as well as weapons and ammunition possession offenses.
Police said officers in the Southern District will continue to combat illegal shootings and the possession of illicit weapons. The operation, they said, will focus on those who possess, conceal, or use weapons and endanger public safety.
Operational blindness or a deliberate strategic plan that went wrong? Will we ever know?
Alexander Maistrovoy
Cars destroyed on October 7, 2023
On July 26, 2026 Dr. Avi Perry published an article titled "Was Haniyeh the double-agent behind October 7?". Dr. Perry presents a convincing argument suggesting that Ismail Haniyeh may have acted as a double agent, successfully misleading Israeli intelligence regarding Hamas’s true strategic intentions, causing the IDF to ignore warning signs and thus enabling October 7th. It is very possible that he is right.
However, I have been convinced from the very beginning that this was not merely an intelligence failure, but a calculated plot orchestrated by anti-government factions within the country’s own military and intelligence establishment - a plot that went wrong when Hamas took advantage of its minimal parameters to plan and carry out its barbaric massacre.
My assessment rests on the following core premises:
First, while Haniyeh may have convinced intelligence agencies that Hamas had no intention of attacking, the sheer scale of the preparations was too massive to be ignored.
Both female soldiers and kibbutz residents repeatedly reported an unusually high volume of hostile activity across the border fence;
Three months prior to the attack, a senior analyst of Unit 8200“warned that Hamas conducted intense training exercise that matched the preparation outlined in the IDF-obtained blueprint" named 'Jericho Wall';
According to a Kan 11 news service, a "Top Secret" Shin Bet document indicated a high probability of a Hamas invasion at 2:58 AM on October 7, 2023, just three and a half hours before the attack began.
Kan 11 correspondent Suleiman Maswadeh reported later that Hamas operatives simultaneously activated Israeli SIM cards that had been monitored by the Shin Bet. This mass activation served as a critical, immediate indicator that terrorists were launching an attack. And the Shabak did not react.
There were additional signals too, most notably when the group’s senior leadership descended into their underground command tunnels;
Later, numerous media outlets repeatedly reported warnings of “something big"from Egypt. According to Egyptian Intelligence Minister General Abbas Kamel, they explicitly alerted Israel that Hamas was planning “something unusual, a terrible operation";
A Shin Bet field agent in the Gaza Strip had explicitly warned superiors that Hamas was planning a large-scale assault to take place during the week immediately following Yom Kippur;
Logically, even if the heads of the security services and the military fully trusted Haniyeh, basic prudence and operational responsibility demanded standard precautionary measures. With all these warnings, they surely should have tightened control over the security fence, fortified border defenses, raised combat readiness across the south, and deployed additional reinforcements to the perimeter.
Even worse, Aharon Haliva, the head of Military Intelligence (AMAN), was away on vacation in Eilat and reportedly took no part in the high-level overnight consultations, failing to make himself available by phone. During emergency consultations on the night of October 6/7, senior IDF generals held an overnight phone assessment regarding the unfolding threat. Astonishingly, they concluded that no immediate action was necessary, scheduled a follow-up briefing for 8:30 a.m. the next morning. They acted like a bunch of idiots. But are they really idiots? All of them?
The Hamas invasion.
The border fence was a highly sophisticated & multi-layered fortification system. Its electronic sensors were so sensitive that detected the slightest movement. Female soldiers monitoring the screens noted that not even a bird could fly past or a mouse slip through without triggering an immediate alarm. The barrier was broken through simultaneously in 60/80 places;
Prior to the deployment of the high-tech barrier, a far more primitive fence had effectively contained threats from Gaza since 1996; under that older system, virtually all suicide bombers attempting to infiltrate Israel were successfully intercepted or eliminated;
Advanced spy satellites above Gaza recorded every movement on the ground, air and sea. The intelligence branch, Unit 9900, was explicitly tasked with relaying this real-time reconnaissance data directly to the military leadership and AMAN. However, the imagery and data received from these overhead assets were not processed in real time - even though Hamas lacked any capability to disrupt this highly sophisticated surveillance network.
Why was this critical intelligence left unanalyzed? How did hundreds of terrorists manage to breach the border completely undetected and unhindered on the ground, in the air and by sea simultaneously?
This means that every single tracking system-electronic and visual, across ground, sea, and air-collapsed simultaneously. This was not a series of isolated failures, but a total systemic shutdown. Could Hamas have orchestrated a blackout of this magnitude on its own? That seems impossible.
The Israeli 'Maginot Line' was not merely bypassed; it was crumpled like a cardboard structure. It was not collapsed by a powerhouse like the German Wehrmacht but by militants wielding primitive weaponry.
The Guardian reported that Hamas possessed highly detailed and professional military maps. Could the low-skilled fallahs who worked inside the kibbutzim and as cleaners on IDF bases have suddenly transformed into expert cartographers? I find this highly implausible.
The massacre continued completely unimpeded for 6-8-10 hours, despite the desperate cries for help from helpless civilians. Some people were saved due to the extraordinary courage of individual volunteers and off-duty heroes “Unhappy is the land that needs a hero," Bertolt Brecht wrote. Was it just another ‘oversight’?
Let’s recall the volatile domestic atmosphere preceding October 7. The "Kaplanist" protest movement relentlessly called for a mass refusal to serve in the military, openly threatened the destruction of the 'Third Temple,' pushed to paralyze the country, blackmailed government. They were thirsty for blood. Ehud Barak went so far as to solemnly declare that the public would ultimately call upon him as a savior once “corpses float down the Yarkon." There was no doubt they were prepared for any provocation. I had initially assumed they were plotting the assassination of a prominent leftist figure - to be blamed on a 'far-right extremists' - but the reality of what I think they planned turned out to be far, far worse.
Immediately after the October 7 massacre, somebody named Assaf Shmuelovitz managed to infiltrate the Southern Command base in Beersheba by posing as an IDF captain. While inside, he illicitly recorded highly classified intelligence data, operational mission plans, and sensitive specifics in a notebook, subsequently sharing this information with an unauthorized civilian. It caused a shockwave through the military establishment. The official narrative claimed that Shmuelovitz suffered from a “complex mental health condition". Do you believe it? How did he get by security?
State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman made exhaustive efforts to launch an independent, objective investigation into the operational failures preceding October 7 and the massacre itself. The High Court of Justice stepped in and barred his inquiry, ruling that “it was not the right time" for such a probe. It wasn't the time? Really?
No, this was not an a error. It was a calculated coup attempt, a plan to show the government's supposed incompetence or to overthrow it, but executed, in the end, at the ultimate expense of the country's own citizens. “When you cut down a forest, chips will fly," Comrade Stalin infamously loved to say. It’s exactly our situation.
There is no ‘conspiracy theory’. It was a classic political intrigue, familiar to humanity since prehistoric times: weaponizing an external enemy, who in the end is granted the opportunity to kill and turns out to really want to destroy the entire nation, to ruthlessly overthrow a domestic rival.
During the Hasmonean era, rival dynasties used Bedouin nomads and The Nabataeans against their rivals. Doesn't this remind you of anything?
Alexander Maistrovoy is a Jerusalem-based journalist and publicist who regularly contributes opinion articles and geopolitical analyses to Arutz Sheva / Israel National News. .His op-eds focus on Middle Eastern affairs, international politics, and Israeli security.
Defense Minister Israel Katz ordered the IDF to prepare for a long-term stay in Lebanon, saying Israel will not withdraw from its security zones in Lebanon, Syria, or Gaza.
Minister of Defense Israel Katz on Wednesday visited IDF forces operating in the Lebanese villages that border Israel.
During the visit, Minister Katz received a comprehensive review from the commanders of both overt and covert operational activities in the area and discussed with them the necessary preparations for continuing the campaign against Hezbollah. Katz later spoke with soldiers in the field, voiced appreciation for their fight against the terrorists, and praised the operational achievements they accumulated.
During the visit, the Defense Minister instructed the military to prepare administratively and operationally for a long-term stay in the territory, while ensuring that the area is cleared of terrorist and underground infrastructure.
"We see here the Beaufort Ridge after the tunnels there were destroyed. The IDF conducted a maneuver here through the Litani in a heroic operation and, with great skill, defeated Hezbollah and took the Beaufort, which defends Metula and the communities of the north and on IDF soldiers and threatens all Hezbollah areas on the horizon," Katz stated.
Katz affirmed: "As the Prime Minister and I clarified unequivocally, we are not withdrawing from this security zone. I am standing here in the heart of the security zone, from the sea in the west until the Beaufort area and the slopes of Mount Hermon in the east. The IDF is here to defend the northern communities and its forces; we will clear out this entire area, and we will ensure security for the residents of the north. Under no circumstances will we withdraw from the security zones: not in Lebanon, not in Syria, and not in Gaza. The lesson learned from October 7th is that we are protecting the residents by the IDF being here, in these places, and protecting them from invasions, shooting, and everything else. This is our chance; this is our policy; this is our approach."
Katz added: “The Beaufort fortress illustrates more than anything else the significance of this policy: we are up here, they are down there; the residents are protected, the IDF is inside, and 200,000 residents are outside. We are destroying the underground infrastructure and all the terrorist infrastructure they built with Iranian backing to invade the Galilee, and we are destroying all the homes in the area. This is our policy. We will continue it and will in no way allow jihadist enemies of this kind to threaten our residents or our borders. We are up here, they are down there, the residents are outside, the soldiers are inside, and the homes are destroyed."
Katz was accompanied on the visit by Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai, Northern Command chief Maj. Gen. Rafi Milo, 36th Division commander Brig. Gen. Yiftah Norkin, Defense Minister’s Military Secretary Brig. Gen. Hisham Ibrahim, and other commanders in the field.
The secret northern pool: A short summer route leading to a cool spring
A year-round spring, ancient mill, and Syrian camp await on a short Nahal Jilabun trail - ideal for a refreshing northern dip without a full-day hike.
Officers' Pool
Looking for a place to take a dip in the summer without committing to a long and challenging route? Hidden in the northern Golan Heights is a trail leading to a Syrian officers' pool, a year-round flowing spring, and an ancient flour mill, with the walk spanning less than two kilometers.
During days when the heat turns every outing into a major operation, routes ending in water become particularly attractive. The Kinneret Drainage and Streams Authority notes that one of the places worth knowing is located in Nahal Jilabun, in the lower section of the stream, not far from the Jordan River.
The route leads to Ein Jilabun, also known as Ein Jalabina, a spring that flows throughout the year. Beside the spring is a pool where visitors can enjoy wading in the cool water, surrounded by trees and vegetation that offer a bit of shade. The pool is not full today, partly due to its condition and water extraction, but the water on site still offers a refreshing refuge from the heat.
The uniqueness of the location is not only in its water. Ein Jilabun served in the past as part of a Syrian military camp that operated in the area until the Six Day War. The structures adjacent to the pool were used by Syrian officers, hence the name "the Officers' Pool."
The path to the spring also passes through the remains of an ancient flour mill and an aqueduct, which was apparently used in the past to convey water from the Ein Jilabun spring to operate the mill. Along the way, visitors can also take in the view of Nahal Jilabun just before it flows into the Jordan River.
What does the route look like?
The trail begins on a wide dirt road that passes between fruit orchards. After about 500 meters, turn right and continue for another 600 meters along the dirt road until reaching a left turn.
From here, the route transitions into a walking segment over basalt stones, heading against the flow of the water. After about 200 meters, you will reach the area of the ancient flour mill and the aqueduct structure. From there, continue up a gentle incline for another 200 meters to Ein Jilabun.
Overall, this is a relatively short route, making it suitable for those seeking a brief summer excursion with a clear and refreshing destination at the end.
How to get there? In Waze: Gesher Hapkak. For those arriving from south to north, immediately after crossing Gesher Hapakak, turn following the red trail marker onto a wide dirt road on the right. You can park your vehicle in this area and set out on the walking route.
https://www.jpost.com/travel/article-905140
Ein Jilabun Officers’ Pool in the Golan Heights6 min rea
Ein Jilabun is a historic officers’ pool located on the Jilabun Stream. Getting there is simple and includes a light walking route of about 1.5 kilometers from the car park.
The officers’ pools in the Golan Heights are another reminder of the Syrian regime that ruled the place until the 1967 Six-Day War. The Syrian army officers who lived at the site took advantage of the natural springs there and built impressive and luxurious pools next to their bases and outposts, which improved their standard of living. Ein Jilabun is one of those pools, four in total which are located in the Golan Heights. Among the others: Ein Jones, and perhaps the most famous one – Ein Almin – all built in a similar manner.
Despite this, the officers’ pool in the Jilabun River is without a doubt one of the most beautiful among the four. If you are looking for a short recommended hike in the Golan Heights that combines all the things that this wonderful area has to offer – running water, scenery, and green vegetation – this route is recommended for you.
The Jilabun River
Nahal Jilabun- or in its official name “Nahal Devorah” – is a stream and nature reserve located in the center of the Golan Heights along which are two large waterfalls: Deborah Waterfall, which is about 10 meters high, and Jilabun Waterfall, which is about 42 meters high – the second-highest in the country after Gamla Waterfall. The reserve is located about 4 km northeast of Kibbutz Gadot.
The stream begins near Kibbutz Ortal and continues southwest through the abandoned Syrian villages of Nefach and Elika. The Elika springs that flow in this area turn the stream into a gushing stream, and it continues west in a narrow canyon to the Hula Valley. In this part of the creek, there are several waterfalls. The stream flows into the Jordan in the area of ”the Cork Bridge” – the starting point of our route.
Officers’ Pool – Ein Jilabun
The officers’ pool in the Jilabun stream has been given the abbreviated name “Ein Jilabun”, after the Jilabun stream that flows nearby and fills the pool with its waters. Like the other officers’ pools in the Golan Heights, the Jilabun pool was built right inside a Syrian outpost for the benefit of the officers who served there until the Six-Day War, and the old and ruined buildings next to the pool were a kind of “spa complex”. And indeed, the place is definitely relaxing and pampering, with clear and cool water and a pastoral Galilee atmosphere.
The spring that fills the officers’ pool is Ein Jelbina (Ein Jilabun). The water stream of the spring was also used in the past for the operation of a flour mill, which is still in place. Since its cessation of use, nature has “occupied” the place, the tree roots have broken its stones and grown right inside the arches and the mechanism structure of the mill. A small, cracked aqueduct that was used for the plant is now covered with raspberry bushes and fig trees.
The pool complex has an extensive area built on several levels, and an open view of the Hula Valley unfolds in front of it. It is recommended to arrive at the place with a coffee set or a picnic basket ready, and just enjoy the peace and the view.
The aqueduct
By the way – a well-known story tells us about the connection between the Israeli spy Eli Cohen and the officers’ pool. According to the stories, it was Eli Cohen who recommended that senior Syrian army officials plant eucalyptus trees around their army bases in the Golan Heights, in order to hide them from the eyes of Israeli intelligence. On the other hand, he reported it back to his operators in Israel, and this information helped the Air Force easily find and locate the bases and bomb them during the Six-Day War, which contributed greatly to its success.
Now, more than 50 years later, while we are sitting in a shaded and pleasant pool – we can also thank Eli Cohen as we remember one of the most important episodes of the fierce and difficult fight in the Golan Heights.
Please note that this is one of the most popular places in the region, so if you want to enjoy some quiet and space you should get there in the early morning. In the afternoon, and especially on holidays and weekends, the pool can be crowded. It is advisable to come prepared with suitable equipment, especially sunscreen, a hat, and other sun protection.
Ein Jilabun from above.
Getting to Ein Jilabun and the Hiking Route
In order to reach the Jilabun Officers’ Pool, you must drive in the direction of the Customs House junction on Road 888. At the Customs House junction, turn left and continue west until you reach the Gadot junction (along the slopes of the Golan Heights, after the Bnot Yaakov bridge). From there, turn right towards Road 918, and continue for another three kilometers until you reach the Pkak (Cork) bridge, next to which we will park the vehicle.
The distance from the parking lot to the officers’ pool is relatively short and is about 1.5 kilometers long. The paths leading to the pool are marked and easy to walk, And we will take the one marked in red which consists of walking to the pool and back the same way – towards the pool with a moderate ascent and in the opposite direction with a moderate descent. Part of the road is shaded, but part is exposed to the sun.
A short walk between the water paths of the Jilabun River, through the ancient flour mill under the shade of the eucalyptus trees – and before you notice you will reach Ein Jilabun.
In Waze: Pkak bridge.
For those who are interested, you can combine the visit to the officers’ pool with other trips in the area, in the wonderful Jilabun River Reserve which contains quite a few lovely places, and of course the famous Jilabun Waterfall with the pool below it.
Tips and Recommendations
As mentioned the place is highly recommended for a picnic. Just remember: you cooked, ate, consumed – make sure to leave the place clean after.
It is recommended to reach the hike with shoes that are suitable for walking in the water.
And of course, do not forget the constant warning about the minefields of the Golan Heights – always stay on the marked trails only and pay attention to the signs and fences (and respect them).
Milton Berle and Otto Preminger in Margin for Error (Saul Jay Singer)
The Shomrim Society is the fraternal organization of Jewish members of the New York City Police Department (NYPD). (It does not refer to civilian neighborhood watch patrols, also known as “Shomrim,” that operate in Brooklyn and other localities; those are separate, volunteer community safety groups and not formally affiliated with the NYPD Shomrim Society discussed here.) The Society was first established in 1924 as a fraternal and charitable organization for Jewish officers of the New York City Police Department. Formed with the approval of then‑Police Commissioner Richard Enright, its creation paralleled similar ethnically or religiously oriented fraternal groups within the department, such as the Knights of Columbus (for Catholic members) and Masonic societies.
At the initial meeting held at Liberty Hall on Houston and Norfolk Streets, approximately 240 Jewish policemen joined the newly formed society out of an NYPD force that at the time included roughly 700 Jewish members, representing only about one percent of total personnel. Lieutenant Jacob Kaminsky was elected the first president, with Sergeant Morris Greenberg as first vice‑president, Patrolman Harry Schreiber as second vice‑president, and Detective Morris Borkim as recording secretary. The Jewish chaplain of the NYPD, Dr. Isidore Frank, announced the society’s formation to the public.
Shomrim Society Purim poster (2026) (Saul Jay Singer)
The impetus for the society’s creation reportedly stemmed from both a desire for camaraderie among Jewish officers and the need to foster religious solidarity and mutual support at a time when Jewish law enforcement personnel were a distinct minority in the department. One oft‑recounted anecdote from the group’s history describes how a younger Jewish officer on patrol was told that he “might feel more at home with a salami, rather than a nightstick, under his arm,” a remark that, whether apocryphal or literal, highlighted the social tensions and cultural dissonance some Jewish officers felt in early 20th‑century policing.
From its inception, the Shomrim Society aimed to operate similarly to other fraternal police organizations: promoting welfare, fellowship, and support among Jewish law enforcement officers while integrating them more fully into the broader civic fabric of New York. Its chartered purposes included strengthening religious spirit among Jewish officers, providing a network of mutual assistance, and fostering goodwill both within the NYPD and in the wider community. Early annual reports and society letterhead reportedly bore a mission statement along the lines of “so that Law Enforcement Officers of the Jewish faith may join together for the welfare of all.”
The historical context of its founding is important. In the 1920s, American Jewish communities, particularly immigrant families from Eastern Europe, were achieving increasing presence in public institutions, including law enforcement, but still faced social prejudice and cultural challenges. Within this milieu, a distinct society for Jewish officers provided a forum for professional solidarity and a space to honor religious observances, support one another in times of need, and engage with Jewish communal life more broadly.
During the Great Depression era and into the late 1930s, the Society grew significantly as thousands of Jewish applicants entered the civil service lists to take police exams in pursuit of stable employment. Civil service lists from 1935 to 1937 added approximately 400 new Shomrim members as applicants passed tests and joined the department; around 1939, of the 33,000 applicants who sat for the NYPD entrance exam, about 1,440 passed and roughly one‑third of those were Jewish, numbers that reflect a remarkable increase of Jewish participation in the police force relative to earlier decades. A generation of Jewish officers from that period rose through the ranks, with some achieving senior leadership positions including Chief Inspector, Chief of Detectives, and high command roles in Narcotics and Organized Crime bureaus by the 1960s.
One of the Shomrim Society’s early presidents who gained broader public attention was Max Finkelstein, a longtime captain in the NYPD. In 1938, Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia selected Finkelstein to lead a special squad tasked with guarding visiting officials from Nazi Germany and the German consulate in New York, at a time of rising global tensions and antisemitic provocations; this appointment underscored not only the competence of Jewish officers but also the growing civic trust placed in them.
Max Finkelstein portrait (Saul Jay Singer)
Max Finkelstein (1884-1940) was born in the Russian Empire and emigrated to the United States, where he entered the New York City Police Department on May 29, 1911, beginning what would become a nearly three‑decade career. He rose to the rank of Captain and served with distinction, eventually becoming president of the Shomrim Society, his tenure coinciding with a turbulent era in global and American history, marked by the rise of Nazism in Europe, increasing antisemitism, and profound anxieties within the Jewish community about events abroad and attitudes at home.
Finkelstein became nationally known in 1938 when New York City Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia appointed him to lead a special NYPD detail charged with safeguarding officials from Nazi Germany who were visiting New York, and with protecting the German consulate and embassy premises. La Guardia’s decision was reported in contemporary news accounts, including The New York Times, which noted that the police detail guarding German officials was composed solely of Jewish officers, a remarkable and provocative arrangement given the regime those officials represented. La Guardia’s motivation for this appointment must be understood in light of his well‑documented opposition to Nazism and antisemitism; he frequently spoke out against Nazi policies, protested violence against Jews in Germany, and worked to broaden diversity in municipal appointments and civil service. In 1937 and 1938, he publicly denounced Nazism, promoted anti‑Nazi events, and supported expanded civil rights in New York more broadly, including for Jewish residents who were alarmed by the rise of fascism abroad.
The reaction to the assignment was polarized. The Nazi press in Germany was incensed; Der Angriff, a Nazi newspaper, published Captain Finkelstein’s photograph on its front page and denounced his appointment as a “provocation,” explicitly framing the decision in deeply antisemitic terms and questioning how Americans would react if Jewish Americans in Germany were to be guarded by black policemen. This outcry reflected the Nazi regime’s broader ideological fixation on racial hierarchy and antisemitic nationalism, and the disproportionate publicity given to the assignment underscored how politically charged the situation was on both sides of the Atlantic.
Within the Jewish community in New York and the United States, La Guardia’s choice was received almost universally as an affirmation of Jewish dignity and a rebuke to the Nazis. Jewish newspapers and communal leaders celebrated the appointment as symbolic resistance to antisemitism; indeed, many saw it as a dramatic repudiation of Nazi ideology on American soil. This broader public reaction should be understood against the backdrop of American Jewish activism against Nazism in the 1930s, which included boycotts of German goods, mass demonstrations, and vocal pressure on political leaders to oppose pro‑Nazi sentiments.
For the general American public, the reaction was more mixed but largely leaned toward admiration for La Guardia’s firmness against antisemitism and far right extremism. Newspapers beyond the Jewish press covered the story in ways that underscored its symbolic significance, with The New York Times reporting the formation of an all-Jewish guard detail for German officials and newspapers across the country following both the initial shock and the sustained commentary. Historians note that such publicity helped discredit pro‑Nazi and antisemitic movements in the U.S., which were active in the late 1930s through organizations like the German‑American Bund, and helped cement New York City’s reputation as a bastion of diverse civic values. (It is difficult not to imagine what the antisemitic Mayor Mandani would have done under similar circumstances.)
Finkelstein’s life after this period took a tragic turn. In 1940, after nearly three decades of “spotless” service with the NYPD, he requested retirement, but was informed that he would be required to face charges related to irregular bail bonds. Before the matter could be resolved, he died by suicide on May 3, 1940 and his funeral was attended by a crowd estimated at 10,000 people, a testament to the deep respect in which he was held in the New York policing community and beyond.
Margin of Error Playbill (front cover) (Saul Jay Singer)
Margin of Error Playbill (first of three cast pages) (Saul Jay Singer)
Finkelstein’s experience guarding Nazi officials later inspired a fictionalized character in the 1939 Broadway play Margin for Error and the 1943 film adaptation, where his unique role during a fraught period served as dramatic subject matter. The play was written by Clare Boothe Luce, a prominent American playwright, journalist and later diplomat who was already well known for her 1936 comedy The Women, which had become a major theatrical success. She turned her talents in Margin for Error toward satire and sharp critique of Nazism at a moment when World War II had already begun in Europe and America was debating its own stance toward fascism abroad.
The Broadway production opened on November 3, 1939 at the Plymouth Theatre in New York, where it ultimately ran for 264 performances, a solid commercial run by the standards of the time. Otto Preminger, then a stage actor and director who had recently emigrated from Austria to the United States, directed the production and starred in it as Karl Baumer, the Nazi consul at the center of the story. Following its Broadway success, Preminger also took the play on a national tour in 1940.
Margin for Error handbill (Saul Jay Singer)
As a Broadway play, Margin for Error was a mystery satire with a definite political edge. The plot centers on a German consul in an unnamed American city, Karl Baumer, whose dubious character – he lies, steals, manipulates and maligns everyone around him – makes him widely disliked. When Baumer is found dead, virtually every person present at the consulate has a motive for murder. Posing as both comic relief and social commentary is Officer Finkelstein, a Jewish policeman assigned by a prankish mayor modeled on real‑life Fiorello La Guardia to guard the consul despite his personal distaste for Nazism. As Finkelstein investigates, each suspect’s motive unfolds, from betrayal of comrades to personal grudges, and the mystery resolves in a twist: the consul’s death turns out to be accidental because he drank poison he had intended for someone else. Along the way, the play skewers Nazi ideology and diplomatic hypocrisy while weaving a detective story that keeps its audience guessing.
Contemporary coverage confirmed that the play’s blend of comedy and political critique was unusual for its time. In Time magazine’s 1939 review, even though Margin for Error included sharp laughs and lively dialogue, it was recognized as one of the first successful anti‑Nazi dramas of that season, breaking a streak of earlier flops in the genre. Reviewers noted that its satirical approach, presenting Hitlerism in an American setting and poking fun at German officials, managed to entertain while carrying an underlying message about democracy versus fascism. Indeed, when the play was still in pre‑Broadway tryouts, the German Embassy in Washington protested to the U.S. State Department that the play was “derogatory” to the Reich, inadvertently giving it free publicity and underscoring the charged political climate in which it premiered.
Milton Berle in Margin for Error (Saul Jay Singer)
Otto Preminger in Margin for Error (Saul Jay Singer)
The film adaptation was released in 1943, directed by Preminger, with a screenplay credited to Lillie Hayward and revised by Samuel Fuller (uncredited). It was produced by Ralph Dietrich for 20th Century‑Fox with Preminger also reprising his stage role as Karl Baumer. Comedian Milton Berle starred as Officer “Moe” Finkelstein, and Joan Bennett played Sophie Baumer, the consul’s conflicted wife. Other notable cast members included Carl Esmond as Baron Max von Alvenstor and Howard Freeman as Otto Horst, among an ensemble that supported the film’s blend of mystery, comedy, and wartime messaging.
Where the play functioned primarily as satire and a political whodunit closely reflecting the real‑world tensions of its moment, the film underwent notable changes. Studios purchased the screen rights in 1941, but initially shelved the project; by the time production commenced, the United States had entered World War II and the anti‑Nazi message that was radical in 1939 was by 1942 essentially mainstream wartime propaganda. As a result, the screenplay was updated in tone and structure: the studio removed some of the more overt political scenes (for example, a subplot about rescuing a concentration camp prisoner that appeared in the stage version) and eliminated the character of a Nazi Bund leader present in the play. In the film, the story is recast as a flashback told by Finkelstein (Berle) while he serves as a U.S. soldier, allowing the narrative to serve both as mystery comedy and morale‑boosting wartime entertainment. Preminger and Fuller worked to adapt Luce’s original political statement into a story that would bolster American resolve and reflect ongoing war aims rather than critique fascism from the outside as the play had done.
The plot of the film shares its basic skeleton with the play – Finkelstein is reluctantly assigned to protect a Nazi consul, comes to observe the villainy around him, and discovers multiple suspects with motives for murder – but it introduces additional intrigue and action characteristic of Hollywood storytelling. In the film, Consul Baumer is in trouble with Berlin for embezzling saboteur funds, his wife despises him, his secretary Max is disenchanted with his orders, and a group of German saboteurs are poised to strike an American port. The plot layers murder mystery with espionage, culminating in the sabotage plot’s foiling and the revelation that Baumer died by poisoning intended for another, consistent with the play’s twist but amplified with action elements.
Modern reviewers often view Margin for Error as a historical curiosity rather than a cinematic classic. Some appreciate it for its craftsmanship, period value, and especially for Otto Preminger’s early directorial work, which paved the way for his later career as a major Hollywood director. Others criticize the film’s uneven tone, the juxtaposition of comedic elements with serious political themes, and note that it lacks the sharper satirical edge of the original play. As one retrospective review put it, the film’s narrative and comedic choices feel dated and uneven to contemporary audiences, though its historical context as one of the early anti‑Nazi entries in Hollywood’s wartime output gives it specialized interest.
In theatrical history, Margin for Error is often discussed alongside other politically engaged works of the late 1930s and early 1940s, as an example of how Broadway responded to rising global fascism before America’s direct involvement in World War II. While it is not performed nearly as often today as the playwright’s The Women, it remains a subject of study for scholars of American drama and cultural responses to Nazism in the United States. In film history, it is similarly referenced in discussions of early wartime cinema and the evolving role of Hollywood in mobilizing audience sentiment through genre blending, combining comedy, mystery, and political messaging.
Together, the Margin for Error play and film exemplify how a single dramatic premise can be adapted across media to suit shifting cultural moments: the play as pointed stage satire in 1939, and the film as wartime cinematic entertainment and propaganda in 1943. Both versions reflect their eras’ concerns and audiences’ expectations, and their combined legacy offers insight into American cultural production on the eve and in the midst of global conflict.
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The Shomrim Society’s acceptance by NYPD authorities and the city government over time was generally positive, reflecting both changing demographics and shifting attitudes within municipal institutions, and the very fact that Commissioner Enright approved its founding and that the Society persisted through decades suggests institutional support. As Jewish officers became more common within the NYPD and advanced in rank, the Society’s profile naturally rose. It did not operate as a political or union group in the modern sense, but rather as a professional and fraternal association, providing networking, mutual aid, and cultural affirmation, and its relationship with department leadership appears to have been cordial overall, even when its members raised concerns about antisemitism or other issues affecting Jewish personnel.
That said, the Society was not immune to controversy. Both in Finkelstein’s era and in later decades, it has on multiple occasions responded to what its members cited as religious discrimination or bias within the NYPD. One well‑documented example comes from 1998, when the Society publicly asserted that antisemitic incidents within the department had been insufficiently addressed by NYPD leadership. That year, Shomrim, then estimated to represent about 2,800 members including active, retired, and civilian personnel, took a more assertive stance in seeking accountability for alleged bias. The catalyst was an investigation involving an NYPD officer named Thomas Pappas, who reportedly admitted to returning solicitation cards with racist and antisemitic messages. Shomrim leaders demanded that Pappas be fired for conduct they considered “unforgivable” for a sworn law enforcement officer, and they further accused the department of proposing to allow him to “retire with benefits” despite the seriousness of the allegations.
Shomrim’s president at the time, Officer Stuart Portner, wrote to Police Commissioner Howard Safir – who was notably the first Jewish individual to serve as NYPD commissioner – expressing that the society was “saddened and angered by the total lack of justice this matter has engendered,” and pressed for “strongest attention” to the case. The NYPD’s deputy commissioner for public information responded that no final departmental action had been taken and that Safir “takes any sort of allegation of discrimination very seriously.” The letter reportedly went unacknowledged at the time, prompting Shomrim to go to the media to raise attention.
In addition to the Pappas case, Shomrim identified other incidents over the preceding years in which Jewish officers allegedly faced anti‑Jewish remarks, including cases where testimony about harassment was apparently not investigated and tensions arose over leave for religious observance days. Officers historically have occasionally requested Sabbath leave or time off for holidays such as Rosh Hashanah or Yom Kippur, and before the NYPD had formal provisions, such requests could be challenging for observant Jews. Rabbi Alvin Kass, the NYPD Shomrim Society’s longtime chaplain, later reported his efforts to ensure policies were implemented allowing officers to observe Saturdays and Jewish holidays without penalty, reflecting institutional change influenced by advocacy tied to the society’s presence.
Shomrim has generally balanced its advocacy with caution about “crying wolf,” as one retired executive secretary explained: new recruits are advised not to declare antisemitism prematurely or without evidence, because once the claim is made and disproven, future bona fide incidents may be harder to substantiate. This reflects a desire to maintain credibility while still pressing for recognition of discriminatory behavior when it genuinely occurs.
The Shomrim Society also engages in a range of benevolent and community activities beyond professional advocacy. According to its current organizational mission, it supports member families through scholarship funds, burial assistance, and various charitable programs. And annual events such as food drives, particularly a Passover distribution named for a former assistant spiritual director, and social gatherings, including family picnics and community outreach, emphasize its dual role as both a fraternal brotherhood and a community‑oriented nonprofit.
Religious and ceremonial life also play a role in the society today. The official website publishes a Shomrim prayer for the protection of law enforcement officers, soldiers of Israel and the United States, and all those who serve, affirming a connection between Jewish identity, service, and faith‑inspired concern for safety and peace. This prayer, while not formal liturgy in the denominational sense, reflects an integration of heritage and vocation that aligns with the Society’s origins.
Membership requirements reflect the organization’s foundational purpose: it is specifically limited to active, retired, auxiliary, and civilian members of the NYPD of the Jewish faith, which distinguishes the fraternal society from other groups with overlapping names or community safety missions. It is incorporated as a non‑profit organization and participates in the National Conference of Shomrim Societies, which connects Jewish law enforcement officers and public safety professionals across the United States. The National Conference, which was formed in 1958 to coordinate communication between local chapters and to support shared goals, now includes societies in roughly twenty cities nationwide, though the New York chapter remains among the most prominent and historically significant.
Quantifying exact membership numbers today is difficult because the NYPD does not officially track the religion of its officers, and data come from the Society’s own estimates rather than municipal statistics. In the late 1990s, the society estimated that Jewish officers made up about three percent of the department, which then had roughly 40,000 sworn personnel, a figure that suggests approximately 1,200 Jewish officers, though including civilian and retired members brought the Society’s total membership into the thousands. The current Society’s membership may include a broader spectrum of NYPD personnel and retirees, but precise contemporary numbers are typically maintained by the organization itself and are not publicly reported in independent sources.
In conclusion, the history of Captain Max Finkelstein’s public assignment in 1938 illustrates both the complexities of American Jewish life on the eve of World War II and the symbolic power of civic institutions to confront discrimination. The Shomrim Society’s ongoing work, whether advocating for fair treatment within the NYPD, supporting members’ religious observances, or engaging with Jewish cultural and charitable life, demonstrates how an enduring professional association can serve as both a voice for its members and a bridge between law enforcement and the communities they protect.
