Firstly, the battle at the Paga Outpost was part of a broader attack, in which hundreds of terrorists entered through a myriad of infiltration routes and succeeded in surprising the IDF soldiers stationed at the outpost.
This brings us to the second point. Up until the infiltration and subsequent massacre began, the soldiers primarily dealt with local disturbances near the perimeter border fence. This affected their preparation for such an attack, as well as the training and drills they undertook.
Notably, their training did not include a scenario of a simultaneous surprise attack across the Israel-Gaza border. This included no drills or scenarios to prepare for a raid on either the outpost or Kibbutz Be’eri, the main location the outpost is meant to defend.
Thirdly, when the massacre began, the IBCT was not sufficiently prepared to defend the outpost. This is despite the fact that Paga Outpost was designed and constructed as a combat outpost with all necessary infrastructure and components.
Fourthly, the terrorists’ infiltration, along with mitigating the sector’s force multipliers, including intelligence collection capabilities and defensive firepower, enabled terrorists to both penetrate Paga Outpost and infiltrate Kibbutz Be’eri.
Fifthly, the terrorist infiltrators attacked the sector’s intelligence collection capabilities and the tank platoon poised to aid the outpost in its defense of the area. Subsequently, the terrorists succeeded in destroying a significant portion of the sector’s defensive components.
Sixthly, Israel Air Force soldiers attacked the area of the Paga Outpost during the raid, but most of the IAF strikes were ineffective due to gaps in coordination with the ground forces.
Lastly, the commanders fell during battle, which affected the decisions that were made and the manner in which the battle was managed. This was exacerbated by the fact that the company commander was unable to reach the command center.
The IDF soldiers who fell defending Paga Outpost included: Capt. Dekel Suissa, St.-Sgt. Tomer Barak, Sgt. Ido Bienenstock, Sgt. Habib Kayan, Sgt. Itamar Cohen, Sgt. Lior Azizov, St-Sgt. Idan Raz, St.-Sgt. Shalev Barnes, St.-Sgt. Itai Glisko, St.-Sgt. Yakir Levi, St.-Sgt. Dolev Amoyal, Sgt. Roi Peri, St.-Sgt. Itamar Ben Yehuda, and St.-Sgt. Chaim Meir Eden.
IDF kills terror cell leader responsible for Paga Outpost attack in Dec. 2024
In December 2024, the IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) conducted a joint operation to kill Fahmi Salami, commander of Hamas’s Nukhba Brigade in its Zeitoun Battalion.
Salami was the commander of the terror cell that attacked the Paga Outpost.
In 2025, Israeli media reported that approximately 150 terrorists were involved in the attack on the Paga Outpost, with dozens being killed by the IDF on October 7.
What happened at Paga Outpost during the October 7 massacre?
As part of its probe, the IDF published a timeline of events at Paga Outpost on October 7, 2023.
At 5:30 a.m. on October 7, a group from the Golani Brigade's 13th Battalion carried out its "dawn alert" exercise, according to standing orders and the situational assessment known at the time.
Between 5:30 and 6 a.m., the deputy commander of the company positioned at the outpost gave his daily briefing to the forces carrying out operational missions. Armored personnel carrier-based reconnaissance soldiers, an alert response force, and a command post force attended the briefing.
At the conclusion of the briefing, the commander traveled to the IBCT at Sakhaf Valley to check its state of readiness. Additionally, the mortar platoon sergeant briefed the forces positioned in the outpost's mortar compound.
The infiltration and subsequent massacre began at 6:29 a.m.
Phase I: Beginning of the terror attack and activity of the forces in the sector (6:29 a.m. until 6:55 a.m.)
At 6:29 a.m., sirens sounded throughout the sector, and all soldiers present at the outpost, including those from mortar platoons, entered protected areas throughout the outpost. Commanders designated the fortified dining hall as the company assembly point.
At 6:30, the tank commanded by Sakhaf Valley's IBCT commander ordered another tank to move along the perimeter fence toward a specific position. The IBCT commander's tank mobilized to another position along the fence.
At 6:31, the deputy commander of the Paga company ordered the Sakhaf Valley's IBCT to board the Namer Armored Personnel Carriers and tanks. The deputy company commander's command outpost moved from the command post vehicle to a Namer APC. This vehicle remained at the Sakhaf outpost, where the tracker was apparently waiting for the forces to arrive. After several minutes, when the tracker had not arrived at the command post Namer, the soldiers went out to search for him but were unsuccessful.
By 6:32, the deputy commander of the Paga company ordered the IBCT tank commander to move to the same position it had previously occupied, this time with added cover from a Namer APC, and to open fire on any armed individual who crossed a certain point.
At the same time, the mortar platoon's sergeant ordered his soldiers to prepare combat equipment, board the APCs, and prepare the APCs for mortar fire, after receiving reports over the radio that the terror attack was a "complex event."
The platoon sergeant ordered the reconnaissance vehicle force to close the guard post and arrive at the fortified dining hall.
At 6:33 a.m., the alert response force that was stationed near the ANZAC memorial in the Be'eri forest traveled to Paga to take shelter in a protected area. The guard at the rear gate moved to shelter in the concrete cylinder near his position and took shelter in a pillbox after several minutes.
At 6:41 a.m., the deputy commander of the Paga company ordered the IBCT tank commander to open fire at terrorists attempting to cross the fence. Several terrorists were successfully hit in this defensive action.
However, anti-tank missiles were fired at the other tank mobilized to the perimeter fence after it identified four terrorists crossing the fence and received authorization to open fire.
Approximately two minutes later, the IBCT commander's tank was hit by an enemy drone that was launched with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) warhead attached to it. As a result, the tank suffered a mechanical malfunction and became stuck in position. The IBCT commander requested an immediate evacuation.
At 6:45 a.m., a tank commanded by St.-Sgt. Shay Levinson closed in on enemy positions and killed 10 terrorists whom Levinson had identified crossing the fence both on foot and in vehicles.
At the same time, the mortar platoon sergeant requested that the battalion command post provide targets to strike with mortar fire.
By 6:49, terrorists had begun firing towards the walls of the outpost from Sakhif Hill.
At 6:50, the IBCT commander's tank reported that the malfunction made it difficult to move and required towing. He also requested the deputy commander of the Paga company to send troops to secure his position.
The deputy battalion commander, who was acting as sector commander at the time, came on the radio at 6:51 a.m. and authorized the mortar platoon to fire shells into the Gaza Strip in response to the terror infiltration. At the same time, a soldier secured in the pillbox position at the Paga Outpost's guard position noticed terrorists firing from Sakhif Hill. The soldier, who did not have radio communications, left the position, ran to the outpost, and entered the dining hall.
Upon arriving at the dining hall, he passed the information to the soldiers stationed there, and in turn it was passed to the outpost commander.
At this stage, soldiers who were in the dining hall were already carrying combat equipment, while others were equipping themselves. The platoon commander issued orders to reinforce the positions and other openings in the outpost.
At 6:52, the deputy company commander updated the outpost commander about terrorists mounted in vehicles who were approaching the outpost and ordered soldiers to reinforce combat positions in order to prevent an infiltration, while maintaining reserve forces for a counterattack on the terrorists. The outpost commander acted accordingly and reinforced defensive positions.
Phase II: Enemy infiltration into the outpost and managing the battles (6:55 a.m. until 8:34 a.m.)
At 6:55 a.m., events worsened as nine terrorists succeeded in infiltrating the outpost through the APC guard post, alongside attacks from terrorist fire coming from Sakhif Hill.
The deputy commander of the Paga company informed the IBCT tank commander that he was unable to come to assist and could only evacuate him after the fighting with the terrorists ended.
By this point, the tank continued to engage and kill infiltrating terrorists until it ran out of ammunition, despite being mechanically disabled from maneuvering.
At 6:56, the other tank, which had charged terrorists near the perimeter fence, was hit by an anti-tank missile. All crew members, except the driver, were seriously wounded.
At this point, the tank stopped, and terrorists abducted the tank's commander. The driver then requested urgent evacuation, and despite not being sure of his exact location, said that he left the "Burma Axis" to move away from the border.
At 6:57 a.m., approximately nine terrorists infiltrated the outpost and split into three squads.
One terror squad attacked the mortar compound from the west, the second opened fire from the northeast, and the third attacked the entrance to the outpost and mortar compound.
Approximately 10 terrorists opened fire and threw grenades at the mortar platoon, which acted quickly to kill four of the terrorists. However, one soldier fell during the encounter, and several others were wounded, including the platoon sergeant.
At the same time, the tank driver reported that he had successfully left the site of the anti-tank missile attack, telling others that the entire crew had been hit, and that he was moving southeast, but found it difficult to orient himself amid the chaos.
After the encounter with the terrorists, the mortar team moved to Paga Outpost through the rear entrance to the gathering point for wounded soldiers, while evacuating the wounded platoon sergeant.
Meanwhile, the battle between the terrorists and mortar platoon continued, during which another two soldiers were murdered. Two other soldiers extricated themselves and took shelter under an APC.
Additionally, two other soldiers fell during this encounter, one at the scene, and another who was seriously wounded and died several months later.
By 7 a.m., the soldiers who had gathered at the company assembly point received orders from the platoon commander, who had taken command of the outpost. The soldiers moved to reinforce positions to defend the outpost.
One squad, under the command of the platoon commander, covered the western side and the entrance to the mortar platoon's position. The second squad, commanded by the platoon sergeant, headed southwest.
Several soldiers were wounded in encounters with terrorists and evacuated to the dining hall.
At 7.01, soldiers requested urgent reinforcements over the company radio. At the same time, a tank was hit by anti-tank fire from the terrorists, who infiltrated the outpost's perimeter from an additional position.
The deputy commander of the Paga company ordered wounded soldiers to be evacuated to the assembly point in the dining hall.
At 7:12, an APC arrived at the outpost. By this stage, the tracker who remained at the Sakhaf outpost was hit by an infiltrating terrorist. They were later declared as having fallen in combat, with their remains taken into the Gaza Strip by terrorists.
At 7:13, soldiers positioned at the outpost engaged terrorists moving on foot towards the northern side of Paga. By this stage, soldiers had formed pairs to provide cover to the bunker entrance, guard post, and southwestern corner of the outpost, respectively.
During a situational assessment, the outpost commander informed the Paga company's deputy commander of an encounter with terrorists, noting that some soldiers were missing certain key combat equipment.
At 7:15, the APC arrived at Paga Outpost, and terrorists who had reached the mortar platoon's compound withdrew northwards on foot. By 7:21, the APC had completed a patrol around the outpost and mortar compound, including locating, firing at, and killing terrorists.
Several calls took place between commanders and soldiers operating at the outpost between 7:34 and 7:56 a.m., during which they communicated reports and updates on the situation on the ground and requested immediate assistance and evacuation of wounded soldiers.
At 7:43, the Israel Air Force sent an aircraft to conduct a disruption strike on the northern side of the outpost, aiming to hold back further attempts at terror infiltration.
At 7:49, soldiers identified a terrorist inside the pillbox at the rear guard post. The Paga company's deputy commander ordered that soldiers fire a shoulder-launched missile towards the terrorist. The outpost commander and two soldiers mobilized to retrieve the missile and moved to a firing position northwest of the outpost; however, terrorists opened fire on them, and one of the soldiers was killed while en route.
At 8:26 a.m., the IBCT commander's tank again requested reinforcements over the radio. The Paga company's deputy commander once again said this would not be possible due to infiltrating terrorists, and said that he would attempt to open protective fire to prevent terrorists from coming closer to the damaged tank, despite the APC also being under attack at the time.
Phase III: Gathering wounded soldiers and continuing the fight against infiltrating terrorists (8:34 a.m. until 10:21 a.m.)
At 8:34, the outpost commander ordered a soldier to bring forces closer to the company assembly point.
By 8:57, the APC had moved to the mortar compound and managed to evacuate two wounded soldiers into the vehicle.
At 9:19, the Paga company's deputy commander discussed with the outpost commander a plan to evacuate wounded soldiers into the dining hall using APCs.
The plan they formulated had two stages. First, two APC drivers would transfer into two APCs parked in the compound. Second, soldiers in the outpost would board the two APCs near the outpost's front guard post.
From 9:23 to 9:27 a.m., the APC commander explained the plan to the outpost commander and emphasized that he would lead the operation and bear overall responsibility. The APC commander also asked the outpost commander to remain available via radio and be prepared to act.
At 9:34 a.m., soldiers positioned at he company assembly point began evacuating wounded soldiers on stretchers towards the dining hall entrance.
A few minutes later, the APC entered the armored vehicle in reverse, near two other parked APCs. During this movement, the soldiers identified a terrorist approaching, who succeeded in attaching an explosive charge to the APC's rear door before fleeing.
The APC's firing slut was malfunctioning, so soldiers were unable to open fire at the terrorist. The charge then exploded, causing a malfunction in the APC's rear entrance door.
Following this incident, a decision was made to evacuate the armored vehicle compound, with the APC moving toward a point south of the outpost.
At 9:41, the APC commander told the outpost commander the plan had failed and that an alternative plan was under consideration. At this stage, soldiers at the outpost returned inside with the wounded to the dining hall, where initial medical treatments were underway.
At 10:11 a.m., the APC left the covering position towards the north. Several minutes later, the APC soldiers spotted and identified approximately 20 terrorists near Sakhif Hill and opened fire at them.
At 10:21, the deputy company commander ordered the APC to move east toward orchards after the heavy machine gun ammunition ran out. The APC moved eastwards and stopped after several hundred meters.
Phase IV: Fighting at the outpost (10:25 a.m. until 4:20 p.m.)
At 10:25 a.m., the outpost commander ordered all soldiers to gather at the company assembly point, understanding that the outpost force was at an operational disadvantage. Terrorists opened fire at soldiers who left the command post on their way to the assembly point.
At 10:27, a combat helicopter arrived in the sector and opened fire to disrupt terrorist activity.
At approximately 10:35, the outpost commander and his partner provided cover for soldiers moving toward the assembly point. They encountered several terrorists at the guard post.
During this encounter, the outpost commander was wounded in his hand, but continued to close in on terrorist infiltrators. The two soldiers killed several terrorists during the encounter before falling in combat later.
At 11 a.m., terrorists attempted to infiltrate the outpost via the mortar platoon's entrance. Soldiers manning a covering position withdrew towards the western pillbox.
Between 11:30 and 11:35 a.m., an IAF unmanned aerial vehicle attacked near the dining hall and other parts of the outpost, killing several terrorists. This successfully disrupted the terrorists' attack on the company assembly point.
At 11:45, another exchange of fire took place, during which at least one terrorist was killed. At this time, six soldiers formed a unified force under the command of the platoon sergeant, who spoke with the company commander. The commander, at Sa'ad Junction at the time, updated the sergeant on the operational situation and said the force was under heavy fire from all directions.
In light of the situation, the platoon sergeant decided to break contact with the outpost.
At 11:50, the unified force began moving in a secured formation through the exit opening in the wall toward the front guard post. During its movement, the force identified and killed a terrorist. Afterward, the company commander instructed the sergeant to link up with the APC outside the outpost.
From noon until 12:15 p.m., the sergeant's force linked up with the APC commander. At the same time, soldiers in the dining hall dragged tables and other equipment to block openings and engaged in prolonged fighting with terrorists who attempted to infiltrate, including by throwing grenades and shooting at soldiers.
At 1 p.m., terrorists set fire to both sides of the dining hall. Soldiers inside began to suffer from smoke inhalation, suffocation, and clouded consciousness as a result.
At 1:10 p.m., a soldier exited the western opening of the dining hall and killed two terrorists.
By 1:13, five soldiers decided to leave the dining hall and fight terrorists outside. Two of the soldiers went toward the kitchen while three went toward the lounge area of the outpost. All five fell in close combat against a large number of terrorists who were positioned at the dining hall exits.
At 1:19 p.m., a combat helicopter opened fire at the terrorists' pickup truck, which was moving through the outpost, but was unable to hit it. The pickup truck broke out of the outpost and fled.
Phase V: Arrival of rescue forces and reinforcements (4:20 p.m. until the evening of October 7)
At 4:20 p.m., a rescue force, including counterterrorism soldiers from the IDF's "Lotar" unit and officers from the Golani Brigade, arrived at the outpost.
These reinforcements cleared the outpost, linked up with soldiers within, and evacuated both the wounded and the fallen.
No terrorists remained in the compound when the rescue forces arrived.
The rescue force returned for a second time to collect the remains of the fallen during the evening, at which time a soldier was killed by an anti-tank missile that hit the rescue vehicle.
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-908539
