Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland’s independence has been hailed by many Israeli commentators as a stroke of geopolitical genius. Certainly, at first glance, it would be hard to argue with this assessment. Finally, after sustaining a rain of Houthi rocket and drone attacks, Israel has gained access to both port and airfield facilities in Berbera, which, it is hoped, will give us the ability to put increased pressure on the Houthis.
Situated just outside the Bab el Mandeb, Berbera’s strategically placed airfield, which the UAE has recently improved with hardened aircraft shelters, should allow Israeli fighter bombers to both refuel and rearm after striking Houthi targets. This should allow the IAF to basically double the amount of bombs it can drop on a round trip mission to and from Berbera. Perhaps more importantly, Israeli aircraft based in Berbera can be over San’a in a little under 20 minutes, giving the terrorist regime there very little time, if any, to activate its air defenses.
And while this all sounds fantastic, it’s important to appreciate the fact that there are some potential risks associated with our use of the Berbera airfield. We’ll lay these out in due course, but first, some historical context.
For centuries, the Red Sea was an overlooked backwater, controlled by the Ottoman Turks. However, two widely separated events catapulted the region into prominence. And these events still have relevance today.
During the 1530s-1560s, the Ottoman Navy was heavily involved in protecting the Red Sea from a Portuguese invasion. The Portuguese who, at the time, controlled a large percentage of Indian Ocean trade, wanted to dominate the extremely lucrative spice routes, which were as valuable then as are the oil routes today. The Ottomans resisted and war ensued. Although Portuguese fleets sailing out of ports in Western India managed to block the Straits of Hormuz, they failed to capture Aden, the seizure of which they’d hoped would allow them to seal the Red Sea. The Portuguese objective was fairly straight forward: blockade both the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, forcing spice laden ships to take the longer Cape route, which they controlled.
While their failure at Aden was a major defeat, a Portuguese fleet did, however, succeed in taking the island of Socotra, where the UAE now has an airfield and military base. After the Portuguese tried to capture Jedda, the Ottomans finally decided to build a massive fleet at Suez and, allied with various Somali states, managed to defeat the Portuguese. Not surprisingly, Erdogan feels that because of the Ottoman Navy’s defeat of a Christian power in the 16th century, Turkey has some proprietary rights over the Horn of Africa. We’d do well to keep this in mind because Erdogan has a nasty habit of trying to reestablish the Ottoman Empire in the unlikeliest of places.
Next, in 1869, with the opening of the Suez Canal, various European powers began to seize territory along the Red Sea due to its new geopolical importance. Coaling stations were established by them, as well as naval anchorages and shore facilities for colonial garrisons.
Being understandably concerned about safeguarding its new, shorter route to India, the British seized Somaliland and Aden. The French subsequently established themselves in Djibouti, while the Italians carved colonies out of Eritrea and Somalia.
This arrangement remained unchanged, until 1936, when the Italians conquered Ethiopia. At this point the British understood that their position in Somaliland was untenable, trapped as it was between the Italians in Ethiopia and Somalia.
When World War Two erupted, Britain’s worst fears were realized. Striking out of Ethiopia in August 1940, Italian forces quickly defeated outnumbered British troops at the battle of Tug Argan, ultimately forcing them to evacuate Berbera for Aden. Although the sight of this mini Dunkirk was embarrassing, the Italian victory was short lived. By March 1940, the British launched Operation Appearance, which succeeded in driving the Italians out of Somaliland.
Eventually, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland United on July 1, 1960, forming the Somali Republic. This union, however, began to dissolve rather quickly due to the central government’s corruption, the brutal reign of General Siad Barre, an independence driven Somaliland insugency, and clan fighting that tore the country to pieces. In the end, Somaliland seceded and declared its independence on May 18, 1991. Although Somaliland was never recognized as an independent country until Israel recently did so, it was, nevertheless, able to establish a stable democracy based on government transparency, accountability and adherence to the rule of law. Its success was a rarity on a continent known for its corruption, brutality and mayhem.
Apart from the unresolved issue of Somaliland secession, there is a territorial dispute between Somaliland and Somalia, which may be the cause of a future war between the two countries. This involves a claim by Somaliland that part of its eastern territory was illegally seized by Somalia. This boiled over into open warfare in 2008 and resulted in the temporary occupation of Laasqory by Somaliland forces. Although Somaliland has not indicated a desire to reinvade the disputed area, it represents a potential flashpoint that Somalia could “reheat", so to speak, at any moment. The Somali objective being to destabilize the frontier with Somaliland to the point where Hargeisa would feel compelled to launch a cross border counter terror operation. At that point, general hostilities would ensue.
Turning now to more recent events, Israel’s seemingly sudden decision to recognize Somaliland independence was actually the culmination of a long planned effort by Israel and the UAE to militarize the latter’s deep economic involvement with the country. Starting with the UAE’s takeover of Berbera’s main commercial port by DP World, the UAE later built a spur linking Berbera to Ethiopia’s rail line to the port of Djibouti which, now that the Egyptians are pressuring Djibouti to cut Ethiopia’s access to their port, will provide the Ethiopians will an alternative, and presumably safer, access to the sea.
This access, it should be noted, may require Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland’s independence. Without a doubt, it would be a very good thing for both countries were this to occur. Ethiopia would finally gain a reliable partner in the region while Somaliland would secure an alliance with a neighbor that could provide them with a significant amount of military assistance, if needed. The UAE is apparently promoting this unfolding relationship as best it can.
At the same time that this commercial activity was occurring, the UAE was also converting Berbera’s old Soviet built airfield to a full blown modern military facility, complete with 12 massive hardened underground bunkers capable of sheltering fighter bombers and a dedicated naval berth where fuel and munitions could be offloaded. It now appears that the berth can also accommodate Israel’s SAAR 6 class covettes.
When this military facility was completed, it was turned over to Israel, which promptly recognized Somaliland independence.
The bunkers at Berbera can reportedly survive missile attack, which is fortunate since the Houthis have just recently announced that they intend to target the facility when their war with Israel is renewed. Assuming this would happen, unconfirmed reports state that Israel has deployed both Iron Dome and David’s Sling missile defense batteries to defend their Berbera facility. Even if this turns out to be true, David’s Sling interceptors aren’t capable of destroying incoming Toufan ballistic missiles from Yemen. The Toufan, a Houthi variant of the Iranian Shahab, is outside the engagement envelope of David’s Sling interceptors and can only be stopped by our Arrow system. So far, there’s been no word about that system being deployed to Berbera. The absence of an Arrow battery might also present a problem in the event the Iranians decide to target Berbera with their longer range missiles.
As for the Iron Dome battery reportedly at Berbera, it should be able to take out Houthi drones and cruise missiles in the likely event they’re used against Berbera. However, Israel’s Iron Beam laser might be an appropriate “last ditch" system to deploy, as well, given the fact that it only requires electricity to operate. This would obviously eliminate the system’s need for interceptors, which are expensive and can be depleted rather quickly in a full scale war.
As for offensive systems, Berbera should be able to support a squadron CD of fighter bombers. If equipped with ER LORA air launched ballistic missiles, our planes should be able to hit Houthi controlled territory minutes after reaching launch altitude. Unfortunately, the ground launched ER LORA only has a maximum range of 430 km, which is just shy of Sana’a, which is 554 km from Berbera. Of course, if small container ships were available at Berbera’s naval port, they could be modified to carry scores of encapsulated ER LORAS. Guarded by a SAAR 6, these arsenal ships could reach a launch position within a relatively short period of time.
Ideally, though, a 600 km+ range ground launched ER LORA should be developed and deployed to Berbera. Assuming a large number of them were stationed in Berbera, we could hit the Houthis round the clock without having to rely exclusively on our fighter bombers.
We should also mention that unconfirmed reports claim that Israeli Hermes 900 and Heron TP reconnaissance drones have been deployed to our Berbera base. These long duration drones would provide the base with round the clock coverage of both the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, allowing either our fighter bombers, ground launched ER LORAS, or smaller missile boats to target Iranian arms carriers en route to the Houthis. Since both drones are capable of carrying air-to-ground missiles, they could also be used to target merchant arms carriers.
Two threats we should be aware of are the possibility that the runway at Berbera will be hit with cluster munitions and the base itself could be targeted with chemical/biological weapons. The Houthis have missiles capable of being armed with such warheads, as do the Iranians. In the event the runway is disabled by cluster bombs, the Berbera base will have to have a repair element capable of fixing the runway as fast as possible. (This is yet another reason why I like the idea of long range ground launched ER LORAS that don’t require a runway.
As far as defending against chemical or biological weapons is concerned, assuming the bunkers have efficient air filtration systems, it would be possible to remotely operate the base’s air defenses. And if the bunkers have double doors equipped with water wash down systems, our fighter bombers could continue to operate, although at a slower sortie rate.
Ultimately, though, any use of unconventional munitions against the base will have to result in massive retaliation by the Israeli government, that may include nuclear weapons.
While the Americans have yet to recognize Somaliland’s independence, this may be in the offing given their apparent interest in using Berbera as a replacement for their base in Djibouti.
In November of last year, the commander of AFRICOM, General Dagvin Anderson, paid a highly unusual visit to Berbera.
While there, General Anderson held talks with his Somaliland counterparts concerning the need to strengthen collaboration against terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Shabab. Interestingly, General Anderson’s visit to Somaliland occurred without the Americans having first asked permission from the Somali government in Mogadishu. That calculated diplomatic oversight certainly seems like a de facto recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
Regardless, the Pentagon’s apparent interest in Berbera is not hard to understand. Camp Lemonier, their base in Djibouti, is uncomfortably close to a Chinese facility, which has been suspected of conducting intelligence collection operations against their American neighbors. If AFRICOM would relocate to Berbera it wouldn’t have to worry about this type of espionage threat. Moreover, the US Special Forces units assigned to AFRICOM would have a lot more room to train in privacy.
At the moment, there are so many foreign military bases crammed into Djibouti that everybody seems to be tripping over one another.
However, whether AFRICOM’s ability to redeploy to Berbera would be conditioned on America’s official recognition of Somaliland’s independence is not known. It would certainly make sense not only given the fact that Somaliland is a sister democracy but, also, in light of Somaliland’s interest in joining the Abraham Accords. Then again, an American presence in Berbera might also help us deter the base’s other major threat- Turkey.
Most people are not aware of the fact that the Turks basically own Somalia. They operate their largest overseas military training base in Mogadishu, which is slated for a major expansion. Turkey negotiated an exclusive license from Somalia to search for offshore oil and gas deposits and is in the process of establishing a space launch facility in Somalia.
More troubling, shortly after Israel recognized Somaliland, the Turks announced that they intend to open a military base in Laasqoray, which is located in the area that Somaliland claims. In addition, the Turks may also be building a naval base in Lassqoray under the terms of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement they signed in 2024 with Somalia.
Lastly, an unconfirmed report from late December 2025 suggested that the Turkish base in Laasqoray might eventually host a multinational “battalion sized peace force" composed of Egyptian, Pakistani and Saudi elements. Again, let me repeat that this has yet to be confirmed. If it does materialize, though, it would further complicate our defense of Berbera. Let me explain.
In the event a war breaks out between Somaliland and Somalia, which is not that far fetched, a Turkish expeditionary force operating from Lassqoray could very well try to seize Berbera. Given the fact that our base does not appear to have a large garrison or even any landward defenses, it’s possible that the Turks could overrun Berbera in a lightning strike. The Turks could also support their offensive with both ground-to-ground rockets launched from Lassqoray as well as a Koral system that could be used to jam our air defenses. Turkish forces operating out of Sudan might even try to interfere with our efforts to fly in reinforcements to our Berbera base by threatening to target our air transports with SAM batteries they’d deployed ostensibly to defend Port Sudan.
This is why I really think it’s crucial that the Americans succeed in transferring AFRICOM to Berbera. I’d also like to see them stand up a training command there, where they could organize and equip a special mechanized Somaliland force capable of defending their border with Puntland. The UAE might even agree to fund this training mission, which would make it palatable for the Trump Administration.
However, in the event the Americans decline to establish this training mission, we and the UAE are going to have to do it. If we want any chance of keeping the Turks and their Somali allies away from Berbera, we have to ensure that a mobile, heavily armed Somaliland force is guarding the frontier with Puntland. We could assist them with attack drones, rocket artillery and air support, if necessary. At all costs, though, we must do whatever is necessary not to have to evacuate Berbera under fire as the British did in 1940. Because in our case, we probably won’t be coming back. But there may be another way of addressing this problem.
One not so crazy idea involves asking the Indians to help us out with training a large Somaliland frontier force. Due to the involvement of the Turks in the Horn of Africa, New Delhi might be inclined both to recognize Somaliland’s independence and to establish a training base in Berbera. They might even be willing to station a few warships in the commercial port- for “anti piracy" purposes. Of course, the fact that these same Indian warships would be able to bottle up the Chinese garrison in Djibouti in the event of Sino-Indian hostilities may just make the case for Indian recognition of Somaliland independence.
As you can see from our discussion, Israel’s decision to establish a base in Berbera is not so simple. Granted, if the Turks stay out of our way, we could probably afford to maintain a minimal presence there, while making life very difficult for the Houthis should they decide to reopen hostilities with us. However, if the Turks decide to establish a large force in Laasqoray and threaten to unleash their Somali allies against Somaliland, we, with Emerati financial support, will have to deploy a drone and rocket force to stop them.
Luckily for us, the terrain in Eastern Somaliland is mostly flat desert. Perfect ground to hammer an invading force with attack drones and multiple launch rocket artillery.
Needless to say, if the Indians decide to help us out, it would make the defense of Berbera all the easier.
https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/420336
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=irN2dL1LENQ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FyMZe-kA_DI
Monument Celebrating Breakaway from Somalia in 1991 Port facilities at Berbera
Small boats at Berbera
Satellite photos of the airbase
